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Abstract
Although the recent progress is substantial, deep learning methods can be vulnera-
ble to the maliciously generated adversarial examples. In this paper, we present a
novel training procedure and a thresholding test strategy, towards robust detection
of adversarial examples. In training, we propose to minimize the reverse cross-
entropy (RCE), which encourages a deep network to learn latent representations
that better distinguish adversarial examples from normal ones. In testing, we
propose to use a thresholding strategy as the detector to filter out adversarial exam-
ples for reliable predictions. Our method is simple to implement using standard
algorithms, with little extra training cost compared to the common cross-entropy
minimization. We apply our method to defend various attacking methods on the
widely used MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, and achieve significant improvements
on robust predictions under all the threat models in the adversarial setting.
1 Introduction
Deep learning (DL) has obtained unprecedented progress in various tasks, including image classifica-
tion, speech recognition, and natural language processing [11]. However, a high-accuracy DL model
can be vulnerable in the adversarial setting [12, 33], where adversarial examples are maliciously
generated to mislead the model to output wrong predictions. Several attacking methods have been
developed to craft such adversarial examples [2, 4, 12, 18, 22, 29, 30]. As DL is becoming ever more
prevalent, it is imperative to improve the robustness, especially in safety-critical applications.
Therefore, various defenses have been proposed attempting to correctly classify adversarial exam-
ples [14, 25, 31, 32, 33, 36]. However, most of these defenses are not effective enough, which can be
successfully attacked by more powerful adversaries [2, 3]. There is also new work on verification and
training provably robust networks [5, 6, 35], but these methods can only provide pointwise guarantees,
and they require large extra computation cost. Overall, as adversarial examples even exist for simple
classification tasks [9] and for human eyes [7], it is unlikely for such methods to solve the problem
by preventing adversaries from generating adversarial examples.
Due to the difficulty, detection-based defenses have attracted a lot of attention recently as alternative
solutions. Grosse et al. [13] introduce an extra class in classifiers solely for adversarial examples,
and similarly Gong et al. [10] train an additional binary classifier to decide whether an instance
is adversarial or not. Metzen et al. [26] detect adversarial examples via training a detection neural
network, which takes input from intermediate layers of the classification network. Bhagoji et al. [1]
reduce dimensionality of the input image fed to the classification network, and train a fully-connected
neural network on the smaller input. Li and Li [21] build a cascade classifier where each classifier is
implemented as a linear SVM acting on the PCA of inner convolutional layers of the classification
network. However, these methods all require a large amount of extra computational cost, and some
of them also result in loss of accuracy on normal examples. In contrast, Feinman et al. [8] propose
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a kernel density estimate method to detect the points lying far from the data manifolds in the final-
layer hidden space, which does not change the structure of the classification network with little
computational cost. However, Carlini and Wagner [3] show that each of these defense methods can
be evaded by an adversary targeting at that specific defense, i.e., by a white-box adversary.
In this paper, we propose a defense method which consists of a novel training procedure and a
thresholding test strategy. The thresholding test strategy is implemented by the kernel density (K-
density) detector introduced in [8]. In training, we make contributions by presenting a novel training
objective function, named as reverse cross-entropy (RCE), to substitute the common cross-entropy
(CE) loss [11]. By minimizing RCE, our training procedure encourages the classifiers to return a
high confidence on the true class while a uniform distribution on false classes for each data point,
and further makes the classifiers map the normal examples to the neighborhood of low-dimensional
manifolds in the final-layer hidden space. Compared to CE, the RCE training procedure can learn
more distinguishable representations on filtering adversarial examples when using the K-density
detector or other dimension-based detectors [23]. The minimization of RCE is simple to implement
using stochastic gradient descent methods, with little extra training cost, as compared to CE. Therefore,
it can be easily applied to any deep networks and is as scalable as the CE training procedure.
We apply our method to defend various attacking methods on the widely used MNIST [20] and
CIFAR-10 [17] datasets. We test the performance of our method under different threat models, i.e.,
oblivious adversaries, white-box adversaries and black-box adversaries. We choose the K-density
estimate method as our strong baseline, which has shown its superiority and versatility compared
to other detection-based defenses [3]. The results demonstrate that compared to the baseline, the
proposed method improves the robustness against adversarial attacks under all the threat models,
while maintaining state-of-the-art accuracy on normal examples. Specifically, we demonstrate that
the white-box adversaries have to craft adversarial examples with macroscopic noises to successfully
evade our defense, which means human observers can easily filter out the crafted adversarial examples.
2 Preliminaries
This section provides the notations and introduces the threat models and attacking methods.
2.1 Notations
A deep neural network (DNN) classifier can be generally expressed as a mapping function
F (X, θ) : Rd → RL, where X ∈ Rd is the input variable, θ denotes all the parameters and L
is the number of classes (hereafter we will omit θ without ambiguity). Here, we focus on the DNNs
with softmax output layers. For notation clarity, we define the softmax function S(z) : RL → RL
as S(z)i = exp(zi)/
∑L
i=1 exp(zi), i ∈ [L], where [L] := {1, · · · , L}. Let Z be the output vector of the
penultimate layer, i.e., the final hidden layer. This defines a mapping function: X 7→ Z to extract data
representations. Then, the classifier can be expressed as F (X) = S(WsZ+ bs), where Ws and bs are
the weight matrix and bias vector of the softmax layer respectively. We denote the pre-softmax output
WsZ + bs as Zpre, termed logits. Given an input x (i.e., an instance of X), the predicted label for x
is denoted as yˆ = argmaxi∈[L] F (x)i. The probability value F (x)yˆ is often used as the confidence
score on this prediction [11]. One common training objective is to minimize the cross-entropy (CE)
loss, which is defined as:
LCE(x, y) = −1>y logF (x) = − logF (x)y ,
for a single input-label pair (x, y). Here, 1y is the one-hot encoding of y and the logarithm of a vector
is defined as taking logarithm of each element. The CE training procedure intends to minimize the
average CE loss (under proper regularization) on training data to obtain the optimal parameters.
2.2 Threat models
In the adversarial setting, an elaborate taxonomy of threat models is introduced in [3]:
• Oblivious adversaries are not aware of the existence of the detector D and generate
adversarial examples based on the unsecured classification model F .
• White-box adversaries know the scheme and parameters of D, and can design special
methods to attack both the model F and the detector D simultaneously.
• Black-box adversaries know the existence of the detector D with its scheme, but have no
access to the parameters of the detector D or the model F .
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2.3 Attacking methods
Although DNNs have obtained substantial progress, adversarial examples can be easily identified to
fool the network, even when its accuracy is high [28]. Several attacking methods on generating adver-
sarial examples have been introduced in recent years. Most of them can craft adversarial examples
that are visually indistinguishable from the corresponding normal ones, and yet are misclassified by
the target model F . Here we introduce some well-known and commonly used attacking methods.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): Goodfellow et al. [12] introduce an one-step attacking
method, which crafts an adversarial example x∗ as x∗ = x+·sign(∇xL(x, y)),with the perturbation
 and the training loss L(x, y).
Basic Iterative Method (BIM): Kurakin et al. [18] propose an iterative version of FGSM, with the
formula as x∗i = clipx,(x
∗
i−1 +

r · sign(∇x∗i−1L(x∗i−1, y))), where x∗0 = x, r is the number of
iteration steps and clipx,(·) is a clipping function to keep x∗i in its domain.
Iterative Least-likely Class Method (ILCM): Kurakin et al. [18] also propose a targeted version of
BIM as x∗i = clipx,(x
∗
i−1− r · sign(∇x∗i−1L(x∗i−1, yll))), where x∗0 = x and yll = argmini F (x)i.
ILCM can avoid label leaking [19], since it does not exploit information of the true label y.
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA): Papernot et al. [30] propose another iterative
method for targeted attack, which perturbs one feature xi by a constant offset  in each iteration step
that maximizes the saliency map
S(x, t)[i] =
{
0, if ∂F (x)y∂xi < 0 or
∑
j 6=y
∂F (x)j
∂xi
> 0,
(
∂F (x)y
∂xi
)
∣∣∣∑j 6=y ∂F (x)j∂xi ∣∣∣ , otherwise.
Compared to other methods, JSMA perturbs fewer pixels.
Carlini & Wagner (C&W): Carlini and Wagner [2] introduce an optimization-based method, which
is one of the most powerful attacks. They define x∗ = 12 (tanh(ω) + 1) in terms of an auxiliary
variable ω, and solve the problem minω ‖ 12 (tanh(ω) + 1) − x‖22 + c · f( 12 (tanh(ω) + 1)), where
c is a constant that need to be chosen by modified binary search. f(·) is an objective function as
f(x) = max(max{Zpre(x)i : i 6= y} − Zpre(x)i,−κ), where κ controls the confidence.
3 Methodology
In this section, we present a new method to improve the robustness of classifiers in the adversarial
setting. We first construct a new metric and analyze its properties, which guides us to the new method.
3.1 Non-maximal entropy
Due to the difficulty of correctly classifying adversarial examples [2, 3] and the generality of
their existence [7, 9], we design a method to detect them instead, which could help in real world
applications. For example, in semi-autonomous systems, the detection of adversarial examples would
allow disabling autonomous operation and requesting human intervention [26].
A detection method relies on some metrics to decide whether an input x is adversarial or not for a
given classifier F (X). A potential candidate is the confidence F (x)yˆ on the predicted label yˆ, which
inherently conveys the degree of certainty on a prediction and is widely used [11]. However, previous
work shows that the confidence score is unreliable in the adversarial setting [12, 28]. Therefore, we
construct another metric which is more pertinent and helpful to our goal. Namely, we define the
metric of non-ME—the entropy of normalized non-maximal elements in F (x), as:
non-ME(x) = −
∑
i6=yˆ
Fˆ (x)i log(Fˆ (x)i), (1)
where Fˆ (x)i = F (x)i/
∑
j 6=yˆ F (x)j are the normalized non-maximal elements in F (x). Hereafter we
will consider the final hidden vector z of F given x, and use the notation F (z) with the same meaning
as F (x) without ambiguity. To intuitively illustrate the ideas, Fig. 1a presents an example of classifier
F in the hidden space, where z ∈ R2 and L = 3. Let Zpre,i, i ∈ [L] be the i-th element of the
logits Zpre. Then the decision boundary between each pair of classes i and j is the hyperplane
dbij = {z : Zpre,i = Zpre,j}, and let DBij = {Zpre,i = Zpre,j + C,C ∈ R} be the set of all
3
Original
input z0
Decision
boundary
Isoline of
non-ME=t 
Decision
boundary
Decision
boundary
Isoline of
non-ME=t 
Isoline of
non-ME=t 
Adversarial
input z1
Adversarial
input z2
C
a
c
b
Detector allowable region
Normal examples
Adversarial examples that succeed to fool detector
CE
Adversarial examples that fail to fool detector
RCE
Detector allowable region
Detector allowable region
Detector allowable region
d
Figure 1: a, The three black solid lines are the decision boundary of the classifier, and each black line (both solid and dashed parts) is the
decision boundary between two classes. The blue dot-dashed lines are the isolines of non-ME = t. b, t-SNE visualization of the final hidden
vectors on CIFAR-10. The model is Resnet-32. The training procedure is CE. c, The training procedure is RCE. d, Practical attacks on the
trained networks. Blue regions are of the original classes for normal examples, and red regions are of the target classes for adversarial ones.
parallel hyperplanes w.r.t. dbij . In Fig. 1a, each dbij corresponds to one of the three black lines. We
denote the half space Zpre,i ≥ Zpre,j as db+ij . Then, we can formally represent the decision region
of class yˆ as ddyˆ =
⋂
i6=yˆ db
+
yˆi and the corresponding decision boundary of this region as ddyˆ . Note
that the output F (z) has L− 1 equal non-maximal elements for any points on the low-dimensional
manifold Syˆ = (
⋂
i,j 6=yˆ dbij)
⋂
ddyˆ . With the above notations, we have Lemma 1 as below:
Lemma 1. (Proof in Appendix A) In the decision region ddyˆ of class yˆ, ∀i, j 6= yˆ, d˜bij ∈ DBij ,
the value of non-ME for any point on the low-dimensional manifold
⋂
i,j 6=yˆ d˜bij is constant. In
particular, non-ME obtains its global maximal value log(L− 1) on and only on Syˆ .
Lemma 1 tells us that in the decision region of class yˆ, if one moves a normal input along the
low-dimensional manifold
⋂
i,j 6=yˆ d˜bij , then its value of non-ME will not change, and vice verse.
Theorem 1. (Proof in Appendix A) In the decision region ddyˆ of class yˆ, ∀i, j 6= yˆ, z0 ∈ ddyˆ, there
exists a unique d˜b0ij ∈ DBij , such that z0 ∈ Q0, where Q0 =
⋂
i,j 6=yˆ d˜b
0
ij . Let Q
yˆ
0 = Q0
⋂
ddyˆ,
then the solution set of the problem
argmin
z0
(max
z∈Qyˆ0
F (z)yˆ)
is Syˆ . Furthermore, ∀z0 ∈ Syˆ there is Q0 = Syˆ , and ∀z ∈ Syˆ
⋂
ddyˆ , F (z)yˆ = 1L .
Let z0 be the representation of a normal example with the predicted class yˆ. When crafting adversarial
examples based on z0, adversaries need to perturb z0 across the decision boundary ddyˆ. Theorem 1
says that there exists a unique low-dimensional manifold Q0 that z0 lies on in the decision region of
class yˆ. If we can somehow restrict adversaries changing the values of non-ME when they perturb z0,
then by Lemma 1, the adversaries can only perturb z0 along the manifold Q0. In this case, the nearest
adversarial counterpart z∗ for z0 must be in the set Q
yˆ
0 [27]. Then the value of maxz∈Qyˆ0 F (z)yˆ is an
upper bound of the prediction confidence F (z∗)yˆ . This bound is a function of z0. Theorem 1 further
tells us that if z0 ∈ Syˆ , the corresponding value of the upper bound will obtain its minimum 1L , which
leads to F (z∗)yˆ = 1L . This makes z
∗ be easily distinguished since its low confidence score.
In practice, the restriction can be implemented by a detector with the metric of non-ME. In the
case of Fig. 1a, any point that locates on the set Syˆ (black dashed lines) has the highest value of
non-ME = log 2. Assuming that the learned representation transformation: X 7→ Z can map all
the normal examples to the neighborhood of Syˆ, where the neighborhood boundary consists of the
isolines of non-ME = t (blue dot-dashed lines). This means that all the normal examples have
values of non-ME > t. When there is no detector, the nearest adversarial example based on z0 is
z1, which locates on the nearest decision boundary w.r.t. z0. In contrast, when non-ME is used as
the detection metric, z1 will be easily filtered out by the detector because non-ME(z1) < t, and
the nearest adversarial example becomes z2 in this case, which locates on the junction manifold
of the neighborhood boundary and the decision boundary. It is easy to generally conclude that
‖z0 − z2‖ > ‖z0 − z1‖, almost everywhere. This means that due to the existence of the detector,
adversaries have to impose larger minimal perturbations to successfully generate adversarial examples
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that can fool the detector. Furthermore, according to Theorem 1, the confidence at z2 is also lower
than it at z1, which makes z2 still be most likely be distinguished since its low confidence score.
3.2 The reverse cross-entropy training procedure
Based on the above analysis, we now design a new training objective to improve the robustness
of DNN classifiers. The key is to enforce a DNN classifier to map all the normal instances to the
neighborhood of the low-dimensional manifolds Syˆ in the final-layer hidden space. According to
Lemma 1, this can be achieved by making the non-maximal elements of F (x) be as equal as possible,
thus having a high non-ME value for every normal input. Specifically, for a training data (x, y), we
let Ry denote its reverse label vector whose y-th element is zero and other elements equal to 1L−1 .
One obvious way to encourage uniformity among the non-maximal elements of F (x) is to apply
the model regularization method termed label smoothing [34], which can be done by introducing a
cross-entropy term between Ry and F (x) in the CE objective:
LλCE(x, y) = LCE(x, y)− λ ·R>y logF (x), (2)
where λ is a trade-off parameter. However, it is easy to show that minimizing LλCE equals to
minimizing the cross-entropy between F (x) and the L-dimensional vector Pλ:
Pλi =
{
1
λ+1 , i = y,
λ
(L−1)(λ+1) , i 6= y.
(3)
Note that 1y = P 0 and Ry = P∞. When λ > 0, let θ∗λ = argminθ LλCE , then the prediction
F (x, θ∗λ) will tend to equal to P
λ, rather than the ground-truth 1y . This makes the output predictions
be biased. In order to have unbiased predictions that make the output vector F (x) tend to 1y,
and simultaneously encourage uniformity among probabilities on untrue classes, we define another
objective function based on what we call reverse cross-entropy (RCE) as
LRCE(x, y) = −R>y logF (x). (4)
Minimizing RCE is equivalent to minimizing L∞CE . Note that by directly minimizing LRCE , i.e.,
θ∗R = argminθ LRCE , one will get a reverse classifier F (X, θ∗R), which means that given an input x,
the reverse classifier F (X, θ∗R) will not only tend to assign the lowest probability to the true class but
also tend to output a uniform distribution on other classes. This simple insight leads to our entire
RCE training procedure which consists of two parts, as outlined below:
Reverse training: Given the training set D := {(xi, yi)}i∈[N ], training the DNN F (X, θ) to be a
reverse classifier by minimizing the average RCE loss: θ∗R = argminθ
1
N
∑N
i=1 LRCE(xi, yi).
Reverse logits: Negating the final logits fed to the softmax layer as FR(X, θ∗R) = S(−Zpre(X, θ∗R)).
Then we will obtain the network FR(X, θ∗R) that returns ordinary predictions on classes, and
FR(X, θ
∗
R) is referred as the network trained via the RCE training procedure.
Theorem 2. (Proof in Appendix A) Let (x, y) be a given training data. Under the L∞-norm, if there
is a training error α 1L that ‖S(Zpre(x, θ∗R))−Ry‖∞ ≤ α, then we have bounds
‖S(−Zpre(x, θ∗R))− 1y‖∞ ≤ α(L− 1)2,
and ∀j, k 6= y,
|S(−Zpre(x, θ∗R))j − S(−Zpre(x, θ∗R))k| ≤ 2α2(L− 1)2.
Theorem 2 demonstrates two important properties of the RCE training procedure. First, it is consistent
and unbiased that when the training error α→ 0, the output FR(x, θ∗R) converges to the one-hot label
vector 1y . Second, the upper bounds of the difference between any two non-maximal elements in
outputs decrease as O(α2) w.r.t. α for RCE, much faster than the O(α) for CE and label smoothing.
These two properties make the RCE training procedure meet our requirements as described above.
3.3 The thresholding test strategy
Given a trained classifier F (X), we implement a thresholding test strategy by a detector for robust
prediction. After presetting a metric, the detector classifies the input as normal and decides to return
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the predicted label if the value of metric is larger than a threshold T , or classifies the one as adversarial
and returns NOT SURE otherwise. In our method, we adopt the kernel density (K-density) metric
introduced in [8], because applying the K-density metric with CE training has already shown better
robustness and versatility than other defenses [3]. K-density can be regarded as some combination of
the confidence and non-ME metrics, since it can simultaneously convey the information about them.
Kernel density: The K-density is calculated in the final-layer hidden space. Given the predicted
label yˆ, K-density is defined as KD(x) = 1|Xyˆ|
∑
xi∈Xyˆ k(zi, z), where Xyˆ represents the set of
training points with label yˆ, zi and z are the corresponding final-layer hidden vectors, k(zi, z) =
exp(−‖zi − z‖2 /σ2) is the Gaussian kernel with the bandwidth σ treated as a hyperparameter.
Carlini and Wagner [3] show that previous methods on detecting adversarial examples can be evaded
by white-box adversaries. However, our method (RCE training + K-density detector) can defend
the white-box attacks effectively. This is because the RCE training procedure conceals normal
examples on low-dimensional manifolds in the final-layer hidden space, as shown in Fig. 1b and
Fig. 1c. Then the detector allowable regions can also be set low-dimensional as long as the regions
contain all normal examples. Therefore the white-box adversaries who intend to fool our detector
have to generate adversarial examples with preciser calculations and larger noises. This is intuitively
illustrated in Fig. 1d, where the adversarial examples crafted on the networks trained by CE are easier
to locate in the detector allowable regions than those crafted on the networks trained by RCE. This
illustration is experimentally verified in Section 4.4.
4 Experiments
We now present the experimental results to demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on improving
the robustness of DNN classifiers in the adversarial setting.
4.1 Setup
We use the two widely studied datasets—MNIST [20] and CIFAR-10 [17]. MNIST is a collection of
handwritten digits with a training set of 60,000 images and a test set of 10,000 images. CIFAR-10
consists of 60,000 color images in 10 classes with 6,000 images per class. There are 50,000 training
images and 10,000 test images. The pixel values of images in both datasets are scaled to be in the
interval [−0.5, 0.5]. The normal examples in our experiments refer to all the ones in the training and
test sets. In the adversarial setting, the strong baseline we use is the K-density estimate method (CE
training + K-density detector) [8], which has shown its superiority and versatility compared to other
detection-based defense methods [1, 10, 13, 21, 26] in [3].
4.2 Classification on normal examples
Table 1: Classification error rates (%) on test sets.
Method MNIST CIFAR-10
Resnet-32 (CE) 0.38 7.13
Resnet-32 (RCE) 0.29 7.02
Resnet-56 (CE) 0.36 6.49
Resnet-56 (RCE) 0.32 6.60
We first evaluate in the normal setting, where we imple-
ment Resnet-32 and Resnet-56 [15] on both datasets. For
each network, we use both the CE and RCE as the train-
ing objectives, trained by the same settings as He et al.
[16]. The number of training steps for both objectives
is set to be 20,000 on MNIST and 90,000 on CIFAR-10.
Hereafter for notation simplicity, we will indicate the
training procedure used after the model name of a trained network, e.g., Resnet-32 (CE). Similarly,
we indicate the training procedure and omit the name of the target network after an attacking method,
e.g., FGSM (CE). Table 1 shows the test error rates, where the thresholding test strategy is disabled
and all the points receive their predicted labels. We can see that the performance of the networks
trained by RCE is as good as and sometimes even better than those trained by the traditional CE
procedure. Note that we apply the same training hyperparameters (e.g., learning rates and decay
factors) for both the CE and RCE procedures, which suggests that RCE is easy to optimize and does
not require much extra effort on tuning hyperparameters.
To verify that the RCE procedure tends to map all the normal inputs to the neighborhood of Syˆ in
the hidden space, we apply the t-SNE technique [24] to visualize the distribution of the final hidden
vector z on the test set. Fig. 1b and Fig. 1c give the 2-D visualization results on 1,000 test examples
of CIFAR-10. We can see that the networks trained by RCE can successfully map the test examples
to the neighborhood of low-dimensional manifolds in the final-layer hidden space.
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Table 2: AUC-scores (10−2) of adversarial examples. The model of target networks is Resnet-32. Values are calculated on the examples which
are correctly classified as normal examples and then misclassified as adversarial counterparts. Bandwidths used when calculating K-density
are σ2CE = 1/0.26 and σ
2
RCE = 0.1/0.26. Here (-) indicates the strong baseline, and (*) indicates our defense method.
Attack Obj. MNIST CIFAR-10Confidence non-ME K-density Confidence non-ME K-density
FGSM CE 79.7 66.8 98.8 (-) 71.5 66.9 99.7 (-)RCE 98.8 98.6 99.4 (*) 92.6 91.4 98.0 (*)
BIM CE 88.9 70.5 90.0 (-) 0.0 64.6 100.0 (-)RCE 91.7 90.6 91.8 (*) 0.7 70.2 100.0 (*)
ILCM CE 98.4 50.4 96.2 (-) 16.4 37.1 84.2 (-)RCE 100.0 97.0 98.6 (*) 64.1 77.8 93.9 (*)
JSMA CE 98.6 60.1 97.7 (-) 99.2 27.3 85.8 (-)RCE 100.0 99.4 99.0 (*) 99.5 91.9 95.4 (*)
C&W CE 98.6 64.1 99.4 (-) 99.5 50.2 95.3 (-)RCE 100.0 99.5 99.8 (*) 99.6 94.7 98.2 (*)
C&W-hc CE 0.0 40.0 91.1 (-) 0.0 28.8 75.4 (-)RCE 0.1 93.4 99.6 (*) 0.2 53.6 91.8 (*)
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Figure 2: Robustness with the thresholding test strategy disabled. The model of target networks is Resnet-32.
4.3 Performance under the oblivious attack
We test the performance of the trained Resnet-32 networks on MNIST and CIFAR-10 under the
oblivious attack, where we investigate the attacking methods as in Sec. 2.3. We first disable the
thresholding test strategy and make classifiers return all predictions to study the networks ability of
correctly classifying adversarial examples. We use the iteration-based attacking methods: FGSM,
BIM, ILCM and JSMA, and calculate the classification accuracy of networks on crafted adversarial
examples w.r.t. the perturbation . Fig. 2a shows the results. We can see that Resnet-32 (RCE) has
higher accuracy scores than Resnet-32 (CE) under all the four attacks on both datasets.
As for optimization-based methods like the C&W attack and its variants, we apply the same way as
in [3] to report robustness. Specifically, we do a binary search for the parameter c, in order to find
the minimal distortions that can successfully attack the classifier. The distortion is defined in [33] as
‖x − x∗‖2/
√
d , where x∗ is the generated adversarial example and each pixel feature is rescaled
to be in the interval [0, 255]. We set the step size in the C&W attacks at 0.01, and set binary search
rounds of c to be 9 with the maximal iteration steps at 10,000 in each round. Moreover, to make our
investigation more convincing, we introduce the high-confidence version of the C&W attack (abbr. to
C&W-hc) that sets the parameter κ in the C&W attack to be 10 in our experiments. The C&W-hc
attack can generate adversarial examples with the confidence higher than 0.99, and previous work
has shown that the adversarial examples crafted by C&W-hc are stronger and more difficult to defend
than those crafted by C&W [2, 3]. The results are shown in Fig. 2b. We can see that the C&W and
C&W-hc attacks need much larger minimal distortions to successfully attack the networks trained by
RCE than those trained by CE. Similar phenomenon is also observed under the white-box attack.
We further activate the thresholding test strategy with the K-density metric, and also test the perfor-
mance of confidence or non-ME being the metric for a more complete analysis. We construct simple
binary classifiers to decide whether an example is adversarial or not by thresholding with the metrics,
and then calculate the AUC-scores of ROC curves on these binary classifiers. Table 2 shows the
AUC-scores calculated under different combinations of training procedures and thresholding metrics
on both datasets. From Table 2, we can see that our method (RCE training + K-density detector)
performs the best in almost all cases, and non-ME itself is also a pretty reliable metric, although not
as good as K-density. The classifiers trained by RCE also return more reliable confidence scores,
which verifies the conclusion in Theorem 1. Furthermore, we also show that our method can better
distinguish between noisy examples and adversarial examples, as demonstrated in Appendix B.3.
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Figure 3: The normal test images are termed as Normal, and adversarial examples generated on Resnet-32 (CE) and Resnet-32 (RCE) are
separately termed as CE / RCE. Adversarial examples are generated by C&W-wb with minimal distortions.
Obj. MNIST CIFAR-10Ratio Distortion Ratio Distortion
CE 0.01 17.12 0.00 1.26
RCE 0.77 31.59 0.12 3.89
Table 3: The ratios of f2(x∗) > 0 and minimal distortions of the
adversarial examples crafted by C&W-wb. Model is Resnet-32.
Res.-32 (CE) Res.-32 (RCE)
Res.-56 (CE) 75.0 90.8
Res.-56 (RCE) 89.1 84.9
Table 4: AUC-scores (10−2) on CIFAR-10. Resnet-32 is the
substitute model and Resnet-56 is the target model.
4.4 Performance under the white-box attack
We test our method under the white-box attack, which is the most difficult threat model and no
effective defense exits yet. We apply the white-box version of the C&W attack (abbr. to C&W-wb)
introduced in [3], which is constructed specially to fool the K-density detectors. C&W-wb is also
a white-box attack for our method, since it does not exploit information of the training objective.
C&W-wb introduces a new loss term f2(x∗) = max(− log(KD(x∗)) − η, 0) that penalizes the
adversarial example x∗ being detected by the K-density detectors, where η is set to be the median
of − log(KD(·)) on the training set. Table 3 shows the average minimal distortions and the ratios
of f2(x∗) > 0 on the adversarial examples crafted by C&W-wb, where a higher ratio indicates that
the detector is more robust and harder to be fooled. We find that nearly all the adversarial examples
generated on Resnet-32 (CE) have f2(x∗) ≤ 0, which means that the values of K-density on them are
greater than half of the values on the training data. This result is consistent with previous work [3].
However, note that applying C&W-wb on our method has a much higher ratio and results in a much
larger minimal distortion. Fig. 3 shows some adversarial examples crafted by C&W-wb with the
corresponding normal ones. We find that the adversarial examples crafted on Resnet-32 (CE) are
indistinguishable from the normal ones by human eyes. In contrast, those crafted on Resnet-32
(RCE) have macroscopic noises, which are not strictly adversarial examples since they are visually
distinguishable from normal ones. The inefficiency of the most aggressive attack C&W-wb under
our defense verifies our illustration in Fig. 1d. More details on the limitation of C&W-wb are in
Appendix B.4. We have also designed white-box attacks that exploit the training loss information
of RCE, and we get inefficient attacks compared to C&W-wb. This is because given an input, there
is no explicit relationship between its RCE value and K-density score. Thus it is more efficient to
directly attack the K-density detectors as C&W-wb does.
4.5 Performance under the black-box attack
For complete analysis, we investigate the robustness under the black-box attack. The success of the
black-box attack is based on the transferability of adversarial examples among different models [12].
We set the trained Resnet-56 networks as the target models. Adversaries intend to attack them
but do not have access to their parameters. Thus we set the trained Resnet-32 networks to be the
substitute models that adversaries actually attack on and then feed the crafted adversarial examples
into the target models. Since adversaries know the existence of the K-density detectors, we apply the
C&W-wb attack. We find that the adversarial examples crafted by the C&W-wb attack have poor
transferability, where less than 50% of them can make the target model misclassify on MNIST and
less than 15% on CIFAR-10. Table 4 shows the AUC-scores in four different cases of the black-box
attack on CIFAR-10, and the AUC-scores in the same cases on MNIST are all higher than 95%. Note
that in our experiments the target models and the substitute models have very similar structures, and
the C&W-wb attack becomes ineffective even under this quite ‘white’ black-box attack.
5 Conclusions
We present a novel method to improve the robustness of deep learning models by reliably detecting
and filtering out adversarial examples, which can be implemented using standard algorithms with
little extra training cost. Our method performs well on both the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets under
all threat models and various attacking methods, while maintaining accuracy on normal examples.
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A Proof
Lemma 1. In the decision region ddyˆ of class yˆ, ∀i, j 6= yˆ, d˜bij ∈ DBij , the value of non-ME for
any point on the low-dimensional manifold
⋂
i,j 6=yˆ d˜bij is constant. In particular, non-ME obtains
its global maximal value log(L− 1) on and only on Syˆ .
Proof. ∀i, j 6= yˆ, we take a hyperplane d˜bij ∈ DBij . Then according to the definition of the setDBij ,
it is easily shown that ∀z ∈ d˜bij , Zpre,i − Zpre,j = constant, and we denote this corresponding
constant as Cij . Thus given any k 6= yˆ, we derive that ∀z ∈
⋂
i,j 6=yˆ d˜bij
Fˆ (z)k =
F (z)k∑
j 6=yˆ F (z)j
=
exp(Zpre,k)∑
j 6=yˆ exp(Zpre,j)
=
1∑
j 6=yˆ exp(Zpre,j − Zpre,k)
=
1∑
j 6=yˆ exp(Cjk)
= constant,
and according to the defination of the non-ME value non-ME(z) = −∑i 6=yˆ Fˆ (z)i log(Fˆ (z)i), we
can conclude that non-ME(z) = constant, ∀z ∈ ⋂i,j 6=yˆ d˜bij .
In particular, according to the property of entropy in information theory, we know that non-ME ≤
log(L− 1), and non-ME achieve its maximal value if and only if ∀k 6= yˆ, Fˆk = 1L−1 . In this case,
there is ∀i, j 6= yˆ, Zpre,i = Zpre,j , which is easy to show that the conditions hold on Syˆ . Conversely,
∀z /∈ Syˆ, there must ∃i, j 6= yˆ, such that Zpre,i 6= Zpre,j which leads to Fˆi 6= Fˆj . This violates the
condition of non-ME achieving its maximal value. Thus non-ME obtains its global maximal value
log(L− 1) on and only on Syˆ .
12
Theorem 1. In the decision region ddyˆ of class yˆ, ∀i, j 6= yˆ, z0 ∈ ddyˆ, there exists a unique
d˜b0ij ∈ DBij , such that z0 ∈ Q0, where Q0 =
⋂
i,j 6=yˆ d˜b
0
ij . Let Q
yˆ
0 = Q0
⋂
ddyˆ, then the solution
set of the problem
argmin
z0
( max
z∗∈Qyˆ0
F (z∗)yˆ)
is Syˆ . Furthermore, ∀z0 ∈ Syˆ there is Q0 = Syˆ , and ∀z∗ ∈ Syˆ
⋂
ddyˆ , F (z∗)yˆ = 1L .
Proof. It is easy to show that given a point and a normal vector, one can uniquely determine a hyper-
plane. Thus ∀i, j 6= yˆ, z0 ∈ ddyˆ , there exists unique d˜b0ij ∈ DBij , such that z0 ∈
⋂
i,j 6=yˆ d˜b
0
ij = Q0.
According to the proof of Lemma 1, we have ∀i, j 6= yˆ, z∗ ∈ Qyˆ0 , there is Zpre,i−Zpre,j = Cij , and∃k 6= yˆ, s. t. Zpre,yˆ = Zpre,k. Thus we can derive
F (z∗)yˆ =
exp(Zpre,yˆ)∑
i exp(Zpre,i)
=
1
1 +
∑
i6=yˆ exp(Zpre,i − Zpre,yˆ)
=
1
1 + exp(Zpre,k − Zpre,yˆ)(1 +
∑
i 6=yˆ,k exp(Zpre,i − Zpre,k))
=
1
2 +
∑
i6=yˆ,k exp(Cik)
.
Let M = {i : Cij ≥ 0,∀j 6= yˆ}, there must be k ∈M so M is not empty, and we have
max
z∗∈Qyˆ0
F (z∗)yˆ = max
l∈M
1
2 +
∑
i 6=yˆ,l exp(Cil)
=
1
2 +minl∈M
∑
i6=yˆ,l exp(Cil)
=
1
2 +
∑
i 6=yˆ,k˜ exp(Cik˜)
,
where k˜ is any element in M . This equation holds since ∀k1, k2 ∈M , there is Ck1k2 ≥ 0, Ck2k1 ≥ 0
and Ck1k2 = −Ck2k1 , which leads to Ck1k2 = Ck2k1 = 0. Therefore, ∀l ∈M ,
∑
i6=yˆ,l exp(Cil) has
the same value.
This equation consequently results in
argmin
z0
( max
z∗∈Qyˆ0
F (z∗)yˆ) = argmin
z0
1
2 +
∑
i 6=yˆ,k˜ exp(Cik˜)
= argmax
z0
∑
i6=yˆ,k˜
exp(Cik˜).
From the conclusion in Lemma 1, we know that the value
∑
i 6=yˆ,k˜ exp(Cik˜) obtains its maximum
when Cik˜ = 0,∀i 6= yˆ, k˜. Thus the solution set of the above problem is Syˆ. Furthermore, we have
∀z∗ ∈ Syˆ
⋂
ddyˆ , F (z∗)yˆ = 12+L−2 =
1
L .
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Theorem 2. Let (x, y) be a given training data. Under the L∞-norm, if there is a training error
α 1L that ‖S(Zpre(x, θ∗R))−Ry‖∞ ≤ α, then we have bounds
‖S(−Zpre(x, θ∗R))− 1y‖∞ ≤ α(L− 1)2,
and ∀j, k 6= y,
|S(−Zpre(x, θ∗R))j − S(−Zpre(x, θ∗R))k| ≤ 2α2(L− 1)2.
Proof. For simplicity we omit the dependence of the logits Zpre on the input x and the parameters θ∗R.
Let G = (g1, g2, ..., gL) be the exponential logits, where gi = exp(Zpre,i). Then from the condition
‖S(Zpre)−Ry‖∞ ≤ α we have { gy∑
i gi
≤ α∣∣∣ gj∑
i gi
− 1L−1
∣∣∣ ≤ α j 6= y.
Let C =
∑
i gi, we can further write the condition as{
gy ≤ αC
( 1L−1 − α)C ≤ gj ≤ ( 1L−1 + α)C j 6= y.
Then we can have bounds (L ≥ 2)
S(−Zpre)y =
1
gy
1
gy
+
∑
i 6=y
1
gi
=
1
1 +
∑
i6=y
gy
gi
≥ 1
1 +
∑
i6=y
αC
( 1L−1−α)C
=
1
1 + α(L−1)
2
1−α(L−1)
= 1− α(L− 1)
2
1− α(L− 1) + α(L− 1)2
≥ 1− α(L− 1)2
and ∀j 6= y,
S(−Zpre)j =
1
gj
1
gy
+
∑
i 6=y
1
gi
=
gy
gj
1 +
gy
gj
+
∑
i 6=y,j
gy
gi
≤
gy
gj
1 +
gy
gj
=
1
1 +
gj
gy
≤ 1
1 +
( 1L−1−α)C
αC
= α(L− 1)
≤ α(L− 1)2.
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Then we have proven that ‖S(−Zpre)− 1y‖∞ ≤ α(L− 1)2. Furthermore, we have ∀j, k 6= y,
|S(−Zpre)j − S(−Zpre)k| =
∣∣∣ 1gj − 1gk ∣∣∣
1
gy
+
∑
i 6=y
1
gi
≤
1
( 1L−1−α)C
− 1
( 1L−1+α)C
1
αC +
∑
i 6=y
1
( 1L−1+α)C
=
L−1
1−α(L−1) − L−11+α(L−1)
1
α +
(L−1)2
1+α(L−1)
=
2α2(L− 1)2
1 + α(L− 1)2(1− αL)
≤ 2α2(L− 1)2.
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B Additional Experiments
B.1 Training Settings
We apply the same hyperparameters when training Resnet networks via the CE and RCE. The
optimizer is SGD with momentum, and the mini-batch size is 128. The weight decay is 0.0002, the
leakiness of Relu is 0.1.
On MNIST the training steps are 20,000, with piecewise learning rate as
steps:[10, 000, 15, 000, 20, 000],
lr:[0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001].
Each training image pixel values are scaled to be in the interval [−0.5, 0.5].
On CIFAR-10 the training steps are 90,000, with piecewise learning rate as
steps:[40, 000, 60, 000, 80, 000],
lr:[0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001].
The training set is augmented by two ways as
• Resizing images to 40× 40× 3 and then randomly cropping them back to 32× 32× 3.
• Randomly flipping images along their second dimension, which is width.
After augmentation each training image pixel values are also scaled to be in the interval [−0.5, 0.5].
B.2 Time Costs on Crafting Adversarial Examples
Our experiments are done on NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPUs. We set the binary search steps to be 9 and
the maximal iteration steps to be 10,000 in C&W-family attacks (i.e., C&W, C&W-hc and C&W-wb),
which promises large enough searching capacity for these attacks. We set the maximal iteration steps
to be 100 for JSMA, which means that JSMA perturbs at most 100 pixels on each image. Table 5
demonstrates the average time costs on crafting each adversarial example via different attacks. We
can find that C&W-family attacks are extremely time consuming compared to other iterative methods.
Furthermore, C&W-family attacks usually take longer time to attack the networks trained by the RCE
than those trained by the CE.
Table 5: The average time costs (s) on crafting each adversarial example via different attacks. The values are also the average values between
MNIST and CIFAR-10. The models is Resnet-32.
Attack Objective Time
FGSM CE ∼ 1.9× 10
−3
RCE ∼ 2.4× 10−3
BIM CE ∼ 3.3× 10
−3
RCE ∼ 3.6× 10−3
ILCM CE ∼ 4.1× 10
−3
RCE ∼ 4.3× 10−3
JSMA CE ∼ 2.9× 10
1
RCE ∼ 2.0× 101
C&W CE ∼ 4.5× 10
1
RCE ∼ 5.5× 101
C&W-hc CE ∼ 6.5× 10
1
RCE ∼ 1.1× 102
C&W-wb CE ∼ 7.0× 10
2
RCE ∼ 1.3× 103
B.3 Robustness to Noisy Examples
For more complete analysis, we investigate whether our method can distinguish between noisy
examples and adversarial examples. The noisy examples (RAND) here are defined as
x∗ = x+ U(−, )
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where U(−, ) denotes an element-wise distribution on the interval [−, ]. Fig. 4 gives the classi-
fication error rates on the test set of CIFAR-10, where RAND = 0.04. We find that the networks
trained by both the CE and RCE are robust to noisy examples in the sense of having low error rates.
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Figure 4: Classification error rates on CIFAR-10. Two panels separately show the results when the networks are trained via the CE and RCE.
The models is Resnet-32.
Furthermore, in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we show the number of images w.r.t. the values of K-density under
various attacks, also on normal and noisy examples. We work on 1,000 test images of CIFAR-10,
and our baseline is the kernel density estimate method (CE as the objective and K-density as the
metric). We can see that the baseline returns quite different distributions on K-density between normal
and noisy examples, and it cannot distinguish noisy examples from the adversarial ones crafted by,
e.g., JSMA and C&W-hc, as shown in Fig. 5. In comparison, our method (RCE as the objective
and K-density as the metric) returns similar distributions on K-density between normal and noisy
examples, and noisy examples can be easily distinguished from other adversarial ones, as shown in
Fig. 6.
B.4 The Limitation of C&W-wb
When we apply the C&W-wb attack, the parameter κ is set to be 0. This makes C&W-wb succeed to
fool the K-density detector but fail to fool the confidence metric. Thus we construct a high-confidence
version of C&W-wb, where we set κ be 5. However, none of the crafted adversarial examples can
have f2(x∗) ≤ 0, as shown in Table 6. This means that it is difficult for C&W-wb to simultaneously
fool both the confidence and the K-density metrics.
Table 6: The ratios (%) of f2(x∗) > 0 of the adversarial examples crafted by the high-confidence version of C&W-wb on MNIST and
CIFAR-10. The model is Resnet-32 and the metric is K-density.
Objective MNIST CIFAR-10
CE 100 100
RCE 100 100
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Figure 5: Number of images w.r.t. K-density. The target networks are trained by the CE.
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Figure 6: Number of images w.r.t. K-density. The target networks are trained by the RCE.
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B.5 Extended experiments
Usually there is a binary search mechanism of the parameter c in C&W attacks to obtain minimal
adversarial perturbation. In Fig. 7 we show the extended experiment result of classification accuracy
under C&W attacks with different values of c.
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Figure 7: The network is Resnet-32, the dataset is CIFAR-10.
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